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1．Introduction
According to Japanese information security white paper (IPA, 2013), the
number of registered ISMS (ISO/IEC27001) certification is the first place in
the world in 2012. The international standardization activities with regard to
information security are unfurled and security policy or the guidelines are
established in Japanese organizations. The organizations pay attention to
technical means of protecting their assets and resources.
On the other hand, employees seldom comply with security procedures
and techniques, placing the organization’s assets and business in danger.
Therefore, employee’s security policy violation becomes one of important
information security issues for organization and we focus on employee’s
security policy violation. In other words, employees’ compliance with security
policy is an important concern for organizations to prevent and reduce their
resources.
Employees violate security policy either intentionally or unintentionally.
Although unintentional security policy violation can pose a significant threat
to organizational security, this study especially focuses on intentional
security policy violations. Employee’s security policy violation is most often
due to negligence or ignorance of security policy on the part of employees
and lack of security awareness by employees even if security policy or the
guideline is present in organizations (Dhilillon and Moores, 2001; Vroom, C.
and von Solms, 2004; Stanton et al., 2005). The negligence or ignorance of
security policy comes to a trigger of information leak in some cases. Several
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studies also make the point that security policy violation is associated with
insider threat to the organizations (Post and Kagan, 2007; Warlentin and
Willison, 2009)1.
The primary research question of this paper is as follows: we investigate
some factors effecting intentional security policy violation for the purpose of
reciprocating the organizational efforts, for example, protecting to the assets.
In other words, we investigate what are significant predictors of intentional
security policy violation committed by employees or contractors of
organizations. Our empirical results do not necessarily offer corroborative
assertions of theory of planned behavior (TPB) and general deterrence
theory (GDT). The findings have implications for security practice and
research.
2．Related Works
As mentioned above, for the purpose of protecting organization’s assets
from misuse, abuse and the other cheating, many organizations utilize a
various tools and measures such as installing firewalls, backing up their
systems, control of access and using comprehensive monitoring systems.
However, these technical or technological tools and measures are not
necessarily sufficient (Stanton et al., 2005; Takemura, 2011). One critical
reason is considered that there is human error and employee do not
sometime intentionally comply with security policy or guideline. Recently,
several studies have emerged to signify the pertinence of employees’
compliance with security policy and guidelines as useful mechanism for
shaping or influencing the behaviors of their employees with respect to how
1 JNSA (Japan Network Security Association) reports that information leaks via USB, e-
mail, and the Internet account about 25% of the whole information leaks in Japan (JNSA,
2011). The reason is considered human errors such as mismanagement and mistakes in
addition to insufficient organizational information security measures.
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organizational resource are used (Vroom and von Solms, 2004; Stanton et al.,
2005; Post and Kagan, 2007; Warlentin and Willison, 2009, Knapp and
Marshall, 2006; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Siponen, M. and Vance, 2010; Siponen et
al., 2010; Ifinedo, 2012). The violation would be considered to be associated
with computer’s abuse and misuse (Straurb, 1990, Kankanhalli et al., 2003;
Galletta, and Polak, 2003; Woon, and Pee, 2004; Lee et al., 2005), non-work
related computing (Pee et al., 2008; Bock et al., 2010; Takemura, 2011) and
software piracy (Peace et al., 2003; Limayem et al., 2004; Moore and Chang,
2006). To analyze not only intentional security policy violation, but also
computer’s abuse and misuse, non-work related computing, and software
piracy, most empirical studies applied TPB, GDT, theory of interpersonal
behavior (TIB), technology acceptance model (TAM) or protection motivation
theory (PMT).
Here, we briefly explain the aforementioned theories. TPB provides
explanations of informational and motivational influences on behavior (Ajzen,
1991; 2002). It is a deliberative processing model that implies that individuals
make behavioral decisions based on careful consideration of available
information. TIB is similar to TPB and both include expectancy-value
constructs. TIB includes all constructs proposed in TPB and suggests that
two additional constructs (habit and affect) are important in understanding
the behavior. In addition, TAM has been found to explain more variance than
TPB in the specific area of technology acceptance. Especially, GDT is widely
used in the fields of criminology. GDT suggests that certainty, severity and
celerity of punishment affect individual’s decision on whether they commit a
crime or not. In this theory, punishments serve as tangible motives to deter
criminal behavior (Beccaria, 1995). PMT has been noted as one of the most
powerful explanatory theories for predicting an individual’s intention to
engage in protective actions. In essence, protection motivation emanates
from both the threat appraisal and the coping appraisal. Threat appraisal
describes an individual’s assessment of the level of danger posed by a
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threatening event (Rogers, 1983). Each of the theories explained above
provides valuable insights into the process behind the individual behavior and
the factors involved.
3．Framework
3．1Model
A basic TPB posits that behavior is determined by the intention to
perform the behavior, which is predicted by three factors: attitude toward
the behavior, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control. The relative
importance of attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control
are expected to vary across situations. Therefore, it is important to examine
each specific behavior such as intentional security policy violation and the
significance of each factor in predicting the behavior.
Intention to violate security policy
A person’s behavioral intention toward a specific behavior is the major
factor in whether or not the individual will carry out the behavior. In this
paper, the behavior is intentionally to violate security policy (to include other
related security policies).
Attitude toward violating security policy
Attitudes toward the behavior refer to the degree to which a person has
a favorable or unfavorable evaluation or appraisal of the behavior in question.
A positive attitude toward violating security policy increases individual’s
intention to perform the behavior.
Subjective norm
Subjective norms refer to the individual’s perception of the pressures
from the social environment, and are often referred to as peer norms. This is
the pressure that the individual feels from friends, peers, authority figures,
and so on, to perform or not perform the behavior in question. A higher level
of subjective norms toward violating security policy increases individual’s
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intention to perform the behavior.
Perceived behavioral control
Perceived behavioral control refers to an individual’s perceived ease or
difficulty of performing or facilitating a particular behavior. A higher level of
perceived behavioral control will all lead to greater intention to violate
security policy.
The punishment level factor and the punishment probability factor
described are referred to in GDT literature as punishment severity and
punishment certainty, respectively. GDT proposes that, as punishment
severity and punishment certainty are increased, the level of illegal or
unethical behavior should decrease. In essence, the unwanted behavior can
be deterred through the threat of punishment.
Punishment severity
Punishment severity refers to the degree of punishment level. As the
level of punishment increase, the individual’s intention to violate security
policy will become less positive.
Punishment certainty
Punishment certainty refers to perception of probability of detection or
the chances of being caught. As the chances of being caught increase, the
individual’s intention to violate security policy will become less positive.
By the definition of organizational commitment, an individual possesses a
strong sense of unity for a specific organization and he deeply relates to the
organization. In this paper, as related factors of organizational commitment,
we use social capital and job satisfaction.
Social capital
Social capital refers to a concept of explaining the importance of social
organization such as trust relationship, norm, and social networks under the
idea that the efficiency of the society can be improved by activating people’s
coordinative behavior. It is important to investigate the relationship between
social capital and a person’s behavioral intention toward a specific behavior.
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For example, it is found that there is positive relation between organizational
emotions and organizational information security measures (Hamaya, 2009).
A higher level of social capital will all lead to less intention to violate security
policy.
Job satisfaction
Job satisfaction is a cluster of evaluative feelings about the job. For
example, it is shown that job satisfaction is a significant factor affecting the
Internet abuse (Galletta and Polak, 2003; Woon and Pee, 2004). They
attributed this phenomenon to employee’s detachment with aspects of their
job and desire to disengage by substituting other activities. Employees with
poor job satisfaction tend have more reasons to justify their security policy
violation and are more likely to overcome any negative emotional feelings
towards the behavior.
Besides, we controlled for gender, age and annual income of employees.
Previous studies have suggested that the intention to violate security policy
may be influenced by these personal characteristics. For instance, gender has
been found to be associated with counterproductive behaviors at work such
as absenteeism, lateness, etc. (Lau et al., 2003).
In many of the related works with regard to security policy violation and
security policy compliance, as method of data analysis, either structural
equation modeling (SEM) or partial least square path modeling (PLS-PM) is
adopted for testing or assessing their models admitting to multiple class
structures or mutual dependency of factors. By adopting these methods, we
can know not only direct effects of factors, but also indirect effects.
In this paper, because we investigate the direct factors effecting the
intentional security policy violation, we adopt an ordered logit equation, not
neither SEM nor PLS-PM. The logit equation can be seen as being based on
cumulative logits. In addition, by using estimated logit equation we can
predict the probability that individual violates security policy. The logit
equation has been widely used as one of the methods for building the decision
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making model in various fields such as psychology, sociology, economics, and
business administration (Cramer, 2003; Powers and Xie, 2008).
Here, we briefly explain an ordered logit model according to Powers and
Xie (2008). Given that the response variable yi assumes the values 1, 2, …, J (J
≧3), which corresponded to ordered responses, a general probability model
can be written in terms of cumulative probabilities2. The cumulative
probability Pr(yi≦j) is the probability that yi is less than or equal to a
particular value j. The cumulative probability for the i-th individual up to
response level j, denoted as Cij, can be written as
Cij = Pr (yij) =∑k=1j Pr (yi = k), j = 1, 2, …, J . (1)
The cumulative probability of the ordered logit equation is written as
Cij = Pr (yij|xi) = exp[
j+xi’]
1+exp[j+xi’]
(2)
where xi represents a vector of explanatory variables.
Equation (2) is linear in the logistic scale. Letting lj(xi) denote the
cumulative logit of yi≦j versus yi>j.
lj(xi) = ln Pr(yi
j|xi)
Pr(yi>j|xi)
=j + xi’. (3)
By using equation (3), we describe the model of intentional violating
security policy as follows:
lj(xi) =j +∑k∈TPBbkXik+∑n∈ENVcnYin+∑m∈INDdmZim (4)
where lj(xi) represents the proportional odds of individual intentionally
violating security policy at level j (j=1, 2, 3, 4, 5), and Xik, Yin and Zim represent
a factor k of basic model in TPB and GDT (k= attitude, subjective norm,
perceived behavioral control, punishment severity, and punishment
certainty), a factor n of environment assessment surrounding the individual
(n= social capital, and job satisfaction), and individual attribute m (m= gender,
age, and annual income), respectively. In addition, bi, cj and dm are coefficients
2 The i-th observation in a sample is denoted by subscript i.
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of Xik, Yin and Zim, respectively.
3．2Summary of the Survey
Takemura conducted the Internet survey entitled “Survey on Japanese
workers’ awareness and information security behaviors” at March 2012. This
survey focuses on exploring workers’ awareness and to information security
behaviors and has been annually conducted since 2009. Subjects of this
survey are Japanese people who have been working for more than two years
Table 1: Demographic Information about the Respondents
Item # (%)
Gender Male 1,060 81.54
Female 240 18.46
Age 20-39 464 35.69
40-49 545 41.92
50-59 256 19.69
60- 35 2.69
Annual income
(million yen)
<1 88 6.77
1-3 191 14.69
3-6 500 38.46
6-10 422 32.46
10< 99 7.62
The total years of continuous cmployment
(years)
<5 244 18.77
5-10 269 20.69
10-20 420 32.31
20< 367 28.23
Listed / non-listed option Listed 700 53.85
Non-listed 600 46.15
# of employees
(persons)
<100 370 28.46
100-300 142 10.92
300-1000 193 14.85
1000-5000 216 16.62
5000< 379 29.15
Establishment of formal information security
policy
Yes 614 47.23
No 400 30.77
I don’t know 286 22.00
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in the same enterprises and the number of respondents is 1,300. This survey
asks more than 60 question items such as attitude toward risks, gender and
annual income, information security awareness and organizational attributes
they belong to. Table 1 shows demographic information about the
respondents.
Since it can be assumed that the respondents are competent and
interested in information security, we can also assume that they give a
reliable and correct assessment. Hence, the quality and reliability of the
study also improves, which might not have been the case for a broader
sample of respondents with regard to knowledge and experience. In addition,
at the current moment, though statistical problem on representativeness of
data remains, compared with classical social survey we point out some
characteristics (Takemura and Kozu, 2011).
Therefore, in this paper, we interpret and analyze data from population
of Japanese registered with the Internet survey company. Of course, we
must discuss the accuracy of the survey. In the near future, we will need to
expand the scope of the utilization of the data collected from the Internet
survey.
4．Data Analysis and Result
4．1Assessment of the Measurement Model
Factors of TPB and GDT
Measures for these constructs were adapted from the study by Peace et
al. (2003). This study adapted the measures by changing the referent
behavior in each original item from committing software piracy to
intentionally violating security policy. In addition, we introduce item Pbc 3
(“If I intentionally violate security policy, my productivity of business would
raise.”) in this paper. These measures utilize responses on a 5-point scale
(Tabel 2).
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Table 2: Demographic Information about the Respondents
Item
Intention to violate security policy
Int1.* I may intentionally violate security policy in the future.
Int2.* If I had the opportunity, I would intentionally violate security policy.
Int3. I would never intentionally violate security policy.
STRONGLY AGREE <-> STRONGLY DISAGREE
Attitude
Att1.* To me, intentionally violating security policy is
GOOD <-> BAD
Att2.* To me, intentionally violating security policy is
PLEASANT <-> UNPLEASANT
Att3. To me, intentionally violating security policy is
FOOLISH <->WISE
Att4. To me, intentionally violating security policy is
UNATTRACTIVE <-> ATTRACTIVE
Subjective norms
Norm1.* If I intentionally violated security policy, most of the people who are important to me would:
APPROVE <-> DISAPPROVE
Norm2. Most people who are important to me would look down on me if I intentionally violated security
policy.
LIKELY <-> UNLIKELY
Norm3. No one who is important to me thinks it is okay to intentionally violate security policy.
STRONGLY AGREE <-> STRONGLY DISAGREE
Perceived behavioral control
Pbc1.* If I want to, I can intentionally violate security policy.
STRONGLY AGREE <-> STRONGLY DISAGREE
Pbc2.* Technically, for me to intentionally violate security policy is
EASE <-> DIFFICULT
Pbc3.* If I intentionally violate security policy, my productivity of business would raise.
STRONGLY AGREE <-> STRONGLY DISAGREE
Punishment severity
Sev1.* If I were caught intentionally violating security policy, I think the punishment would be
VERY HIGH <-> VERY LOW
Sev2.* If I were caught intentionally violating security policy, I would be severely punished.
STRONGLY AGREE <-> STRONGLY DISAGREE
Punishment certainty
Cert1.* If I intentionally violated security policy, the probability I would be caught is
VERY LOW <->VERY HIGH
Cert2. If I intentionally violated security policy, I would probably be caught.
STRONGLY AGREE <-> STRONGLY DISAGREE
Social capital
Scap1. There are many people who do not comply with the rule in my workplace.
Scap2. No one warns even if there is a person who do not comply with the rule in my workplace.
Scap3. There is the feeling that person’s breaking the rule is unavoidable in some degree in my
workplace.
Scap4. There is the feeling that person’s breaking the rule is allowable if it is not found out.
Scap5. I have a lot of opportunity to come in contact with the people who do not comply with the rules
in the workplace.
STRONGLY AGREE <-> STRONGLY DISAGREE
Job satisfaction
JSat The degree of satisfaction for my current job is
VERY UNSATISFIED <-> VERY SATISFIED
*: Resersed item.
佐賀大学経済論集 第46巻第6号
―30―
Table 3: Factor analysis results
Factor Items Factor loading
Attitude Att1. 0．7811
Att2. 0．8070
Att3. 0．7129
Att4. 0．7650
Subjective norm Norm1. 0．4393
Norm2. 0．5901
Norm3. 0．5542
Perceived behavioral control Pbc1. 0．1755
Pbc2. 0．3300
Pbc3. 0．3439
Punishment severity Sev1. 0．4867
Sev2. 0．4867
Punishment certainty Cert1. 0．5025
Cert2. 0．5025
Social capital Scap1. 0．8303
Scap2. 0．7963
Scap3. 0．8582
Scap4. 0．8881
Scap5. 0．8778
Factor of environment assessment surrounding the individual
Measures of social capital and job satisfaction utilize responses on a 5-
point scale and 11-point scale, respectively.
First of all, for reflective constructs, internal consistency was measured
using Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient. Two constructs of “Attitude”
and “Social capital” have scores above the recommended level of 0.7, but the
other constructs have scores below the level.
Next, factor analysis is used to reveal the latent structure of the
explanatory variables. With exception to the factor “Perceived behavioral
control”, all item loadings on stipulated constructs are greater than or close to
the required 0.5. The results of factor analysis are shown in Table 3.
In addition, Figure1show the distribution of respondents’ job
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Figure1：Distribution of Job Satisfaction
satisfaction. If the degree of satisfaction for respondent’s current job is very
unsatisfied, he would select “0”. In contrast, if the degree is very satisfied, he
would select “10”. Most of respondents (about 21.5% of respondents) select “5”.
With regard to explained variable (intention to violate security policy),
we adopt the following calculation as a composite scale:
Int = Int1 + Int2 + Int3
3
where the factor “Int” is an integer number because fraction is truncated.
That is, the factor “Int” is an integer number; 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5. The higher “Int”
represents that the individual has more intention to violate security policy.
Figure 2: Distribution of Intention to Violate Security Policy
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Table 4: Ordered Logit Estimates
Variable (Factor) Estimate z p-value
Attitude 0．9833 11．25 0．000
Subjective norm 0．3144 2．98 0．003
Perceived behavioral control －0．9231 －5．84 0．000
Punishment severity 0．3693 2．37 0．018
Punishment certainty 0．1799 1．28 0．201
Social capital －0．2156 －2．92 0．004
Job satisfaction －0．0615 －2．14 0．033
Gender (Male=1; Female=0) －0．4549 －2．82 0．005
Age －0．0147 －2．12 0．034
Annual income 0．0570 0．82 0．412
/cut-1 －3．594 0．47
/cut-2 －0．709 0．46
/cut-3 3．551 0．50
Pseudo R2 0．2005
Log likelihood －1144．037
LR chi2(10) 397．06
Figure 2 show the distribution of respondents’ Intention to violate
security policy. No one select “5” (No one select all “5” in each item) in this
survey. Most of respondents (about 43.9% of respondents) select “2”.
4．2Test of the Ordered Logit Equation
The result of ordered logit analysis is shown in Table 4. Note that /cut-i
(i=1, 2, 3) in Table 4 is thought of as cut-points, thresholds, or separate
intercepts, corresponding to the ordered categories of the explained variable.
The all estimated coefficients of explanatory variables except
Punishment certainty and Annual income are statistically significant at 1% or
5% level. The signs of Attitude, Subjective norm and Punishment severity
are positive and the signs of the others are negative.
First of all, with regard to factors of TBP, the signs of them are assumed
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to be positive. The signs of Attitude and Subjective norm are consistent with
the assertion of TPB, but the sign of Perceived behavioral control is not
consistent. That is, positive attitude and a higher level of subjective norm
increase individual’s intention to perform the security policy violation. On the
other hand, a higher level of perceived behavioral control lead to smaller
intention to violate security policy. The reason that the sign of Perceived
behavioral control is negative is guessed to be that Cronbach’s alpha is below
the recommended level of 0.7 and that item loadings of Perceived behavioral
control in Table 3 are smaller to the required 0.5 considerably.
Next, though the signs of factors of GDT are assumed to be negative, the
sign of Punishment severity is positive and Punishment certainty is not
statistically significant. These factors are not consistent with hypotheses in
GDT. This result means that the individual’s intention to violate security
policy becomes more positive as the level of punishment increase and that
there are no relation between his intention and the chances of being caught.
Third, with regard to environment assessment surrounding the
individual, the signs of Social capital and Job satisfaction are negative and
they are consistent with the assertion of similar previous literatures (Galletta
and Polak, 2003; Woon and Pee, 2004; Hamaya. 2009). That is, the higher
environment assessment surrounding the individual lead to less intention to
violate security policy.
In addition, with regard to personal characteristics, the signs of Gender
and Age are statistically significant and negative, but Annual income is not
statistically significant. This results means that gender and age are
associated with intention to violate security policy, but annual income is not
associated with the intention. The older age leads to less intention to violate
security policy and the female tends to violate security policy than the male if
anything.
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Figure 3: Risk Assessment of Violating Security Policy
4．3Discussion and Implications
By using ordered logit equation, we investigate some factors associated
with the intention to violate security policy which suggested in two relevant
theories, i.e., TPB and GDT. As a result, it is confirmed that attitude and
subjective norm are consistent with the assertion of TPB, but perceived
behavioral control is not. As mentioned above, a reason is considered that
data on perceived behavioral control may be invalid, but as the other
possibility it is considered that a higher level of perceived behavioral control
may lead not to greater intention to violate security policy. We will conduct
further study in regard to this point in the near future.
As an interesting point it is confirmed that violating security policy can
not necessarily be deterred through the threat of punishment. According to
‘‘Survey on Japanese workers’ awareness and information security
behaviors,’’ though around 27.9% of respondents assess (intentional) security
policy violation as comparatively high risk, many of respondents do not
assess the violation as high risk (Figure 3). Thus, they may just regard the
punishment as incredible threat because they image that the security policy
violation is not risky.
In addition, heightening social capital and job satisfaction are leading to
less intention to violate security policy as the same as effects of subjective
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norms in TPB. This implies that workplace environment is an important
factor of complying with security policy.
It is not easy for the organizations to change employees’ psychological
factors such as attitude and perceived behavioral control, but they can
reduce intentional security policy violation by improving their workplace
environment, not by strengthening the punishment.
Because we adopt the ordered logit equation, we can predict the
probabity that individual intentionally violates security polity by equation (4)
and the estimated coefficients in Table 4. For example, we show the
predicted results in Figures 4 and 5. The horizontal axis in each table
Figure 4: The predicted probability of violating security policy by gender
Figure 5: The predicted probability of violating security policy by age
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represents the degree of violating security policy calculated by equation (4).
If we regard age as proxy variable of length of employment, Figure 5
may be interpreted as follows: though they violate security policy for
improving their performance at their first youth, they come to comply with
the policy by understanding the importance of the organizational rule as the
age goes up.
5．Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate some factors associated with the intentional
violate security policy violation which suggested in two relevant theories, i.e.,
TPB and GDT. To test our model, we conduct the Internet survey entitled
“Survey on Japanese workers’ awareness and information security
behaviors”’ at March 2012 and adopt the ordered logit equation for data
collected from the survey as an analytical method. As a result, first of all, it is
confirmed that attitude and subjective norm are consistent with the assertion
of TPB, but perceived behavioral control is not. Second, it is confirmed that
the punishment of severity and the punishment certainty are not consistent
with the assertion of GDT. Third, it is confirmed that effects of social capital
and job satisfaction are valid to the practices and that workplace
environment is an important factor of complying with security policy. In
addition, it is confirmed that gender and age are associated with intention to
violate security policy, but annual income is not associated with the intention.
As a consequence of our data analysis, we make the point that the
organizations can reduce intentional security policy violation by improving
their workplace environment, not by strengthening the punishment.
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